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Abstract
This paper explores revolutionary and 
rural politics through the case study of 
Al-Tahseen, a small village in the Egyptian 
Delta that witnessed an administrative 
secessionist movement in 2012 and a 
lineage of protests since 2008. The paper 
interrogates the relationship between pol-
itics at the rural level and the 25 January 
revolution in 2011, the 18-day mass protest 
that led to the ouster of long-time Pres-
ident Hosni Mubarak. Indeed, parallels 
can be drawn between the protest move-
ment in Al-Tahseen and the 25 January 
revolution. While the villagers were 
not part of the latter, they watched it 
closely on television and modelled their 
sequence and choice of collective action 
accordingly. Al-Tahseen experienced its 
own local revolution, which the villag-
ers consciously differentiated from the 
25 January uprising. Through this case 
study, I explore how protest tactics shift 
with changing political regimes, and 
highlight the complicated ways in which 
rural lived experiences relate to the more 
popularly known 2011 revolution, which 
is often seen and described as an urban 
revolution.
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Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the revolutionary politics of Al-Tahseen, a village situated at 
the margins of the grand narrative of the 25 January Egyptian Revolution, understood as 
the 18-day uprising that led to the ouster of ex-President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Rather 
than perpetuating prevalent narratives about marginalised rural communities and disem-
powered farmers, this paper1 aims to highlight Al-Tahseen’s own revolution, which was 
influenced by the 25 January uprising, but is differentiable from it as well. In effect, Al-Tah-
seen has its own history of dissent, and according to its people, its own revolution. While 
protests unfolded in Cairo’s Tahrir square in 2011, Al-Tahseen villagers observed closely, 
hoping the political moment would yield positive change so that they could resume their 
own local revolution, which began in 2008. 
Rural politics is often overshadowed by urban mobilisations. This is particularly the case 
for literature covering the Arab Spring revolutions. As Reem Saad argues, the story of 
the Egyptian uprising remains incomplete without taking into account the role of rural 
politics in shaping national events.2 In particular, rural Egypt witnessed a new phase of 
collective action in the decade leading up to 2011, which was marked by an increasing 
number of protests, new tactics, as well as demands that went beyond land tenure and 
subsistence.3 Some scholars4 actively neglect the village in their accounts of the 25 January 
revolution, viewing the latter as a rupture with the status quo, enabled and carried out by 
the city par excellence. This assertion is hard to challenge considering that Tahrir Square 
is an iconic symbol of the revolution. Other accounts5 have attempted to bring the village 
back into the story by focusing on the participation of rural youth in the 18-day upris-
ing, namely how they travelled to cities (especially Cairo) to join protests, and how they 
organised popular committees (legan shaabeya) to protect their villages in the absence of 
law enforcement.6 Still, these accounts tend to spatially configure the 25 January revolu-
tion as a city event, temporally fixing it as a sudden mass mobilisation. In doing so, such 
accounts dictate specific actors as revolutionary, overlooking others that also contributed 
to the uprising and its aftermath. This in turn questions how we define ‘the revolution’; is 
it 25 January or is it the larger, pluralistic mobilisation of which the latter was the epitome? 
1   This paper is based on an ethnography carried out from September 2012 to October 2015, through 
several trips to Al-Tahseen, in addition to a number of interviews intermittently conducted between 
December 2016 and January 2019. I refer to Al-Tahseen as a village, given that many of its inhabitants 
consider it as such, rather than an ‘ezba, which is its official designation according to the country’s 
system of administrative division. 
2   Reem Saad, ‘Before the Spring: Shifting Patterns of Protest in Rural Egypt’ in A. Ghazal and J. Hanssen 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle Eastern and North African History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).
3   Ibid.
4   Saskia Sassen, ‘The Global Street: Making the Political’, Globalizations 8/5 (2011), pp. 573–9.
5   Lila Abu Lughod, ‘Living the “Revolution” in an Egyptian Village: Moral Action in a National Space’, 
American Ethnologist 39/1 (2012), pp. 21–5.
6   Asya El-Meehy, ‘Egypt’s Popular Committees: From Moments of Madness to NGO Dilemmas’, Middle 
East Report 265 (2012), pp. 29–33.
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Commentators have consequently spoken of ‘two revolutions’ or a mobilisation at ‘two 
fronts’; one characterised by mass protests for better livelihoods, while the other refers to 
a smaller group of activists fighting for longer-lasting, structural change.7 In this paper, I 
refer to ‘the 25 January revolution’ as the 18-day uprising that led to the ouster of President 
Hosni Mubarak. While my interlocutors in the village refer to ‘the revolution’ or al-thawra, 
mainly to denote those 18 days, they say ‘our revolution’ or thawretna in reference to their 
ongoing struggle for rights and justice in Al-Tahseen specifically. The villagers tempo-
rally consider the 25 January revolution as the 18-day uprising, while viewing their own in 
Al-Tahseen as a long-term and ongoing struggle. 
Some scholars have drawn attention to the series of farmer-led revolts in both Tunisia and 
Egypt before, during and after their respective revolutions in 2011. However, such narra-
tives have often been disregarded by the media.8 The ethnographic work presented in this 
paper builds on this strand of overlooked narratives but reaches different conclusions 
about the relationship of Al-Tahseen – a marginalised9 village – to the 25 January revolu-
tion. I argue that Al-Tahseen’s connection or involvement with the latter is complex and 
goes beyond unilateral assessments of direct participation in protests. While the villag-
ers did not physically partake in the 25 January revolution, they watched it on television 
closely and modelled their timeline and choice of local collective actions accordingly. 
They consciously differentiated their modes of dissent from protests at the national level, 
while learning from urban activists’ tactics and mistakes. Through its radical politics of 
secession, and its dis-identification with opposition politics, Al-Tahseen’s mobilisation 
simultaneously represents rural politics in its most defiant and acquiescent forms.
Welcome to Al-Tahseen
Al-Tahseen is a small village of 3,000 inhabitants on the Nile Delta, in the Daqahleya gover-
norate. For decades, it faced a lack of basic services, like many other impoverished villages 
in the Delta and Upper Egypt. It is nonetheless important to highlight Al-Tahseen’s history 
in particular, because of its significance in shaping the villagers’ struggle and demands. 
In effect, Al-Tahseen was the product of a socialist project during the agrarian reform 
period (1952–61). It was constructed as a hub for certain agricultural products, whereby 
farmers were provided with financial and in-kind resources as part of the state’s plan to 
improve agricultural production10 (hence the name Al-Tahseen, meaning ‘betterment’ in 
7   Ahmad Shokr, ‘Reflections on Two Revolutions’, Middle East Report 265 (2012), pp. 2–12.
8   Habib Ayeb and Ray Bush, ‘Small Farmer Uprisings and Rural Neglect in Egypt and Tunisia’, Middle East 
Report 272 (2014), pp. 2–10.
9   Al-Tahseen’s ‘marginalisation’ refers to its physical isolation; its inadequate road infrastructure, lack of 
connectivity to the rest of the governorate, the absence of law enforcement as well as the lack of media 
coverage it receives. Despite these forms of marginalisation, this paper demonstrates that Al-Tahseen is 
certainly not at the margins of Egyptian revolutionary history.
10   The agrarian reform led by Nasser in 1952–61, which called an end to the feudalist system, was pre-
mised on ensuring a fair division of land among citizens. Law 178 also aimed to change the relationship 
between landowners and tenant farmers, whereby the farmer would pay a small amount of rent to the 
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Arabic). With Nasser’s death, and the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, 
Al-Tahseen’s infrastructure decayed, particularly after Law 96 was issued in 1992, offi-
cially ending the agrarian reform period, cancelling land rent, and privatising agricultural 
associations. The state’s economic system, which had been supportive of small farmers, 
was suddenly replaced by one controlled by the free market economy and reliant on the 
success of large agrarian companies.11 As a result, the state required farmers to pay for the 
land they toil according to the market price. While some were able to do so, others were 
still mired in debt and forced to leave their lands. Agriculture remains the village’s main 
source of revenue, but rather than providing produce to the state, Al-Tahseen now works 
for foreign companies who control the farmers’ means of subsistence, particularly corn, 
the village’s key commodity. This history is crucial in defining the villagers’ complicated 
relationship to the state, specifically their perspectives on the state’s role in their lives 
and their duties as farmers contributing to the food basket (and progress) of the nation. 
Al-Tahseen’s villagers are haunted by the spectre of Nasser’s welfare state – a history that 
continues to shape their expectations of government.
For a long time, Al-Tahseen was trapped in a vicious cycle of economic and social depri-
vation, characterised by a lack of essential social services and infrastructure, including 
health clinics, educational institutions and sewage systems in addition to systematic 
obstacles that undermine its agricultural activities. Al-Tahseen’s entrapment is exacer-
bated by the poor condition of its main road, which connects the villagers to what they 
call ‘the outer world’ (al-ʿalam al-kharegy). Al-Tahseen’s only access to essential services 
(such as schools, health clinics, government offices, markets) is at Shammas, a neigh-
bouring village that can be reached through a 3-kilometre, narrow dirt path (bordered by 
a canal on one side and farm lands on the other) that the villagers call ‘the death road’. In 
their collective imagination, fixing it is the key to solving all their problems. Furthermore, 
at the end of the road is an unfenced bridge that is subject to multiple collapses every year 
and serves as the village’s only entrance. It has caused several car accidents and physical 
incidents, of which a particularly haunting one in the village’s collective memory is of a 
bride and groom who fell off while being paraded on their wedding day. For the people of 
Al-Tahseen, the ‘the death road’ signifies their isolation; being stuck in time and place, and 
thus became a key site and symbol of their struggle and collective demands. 
Al-Tahseen’s Movement (2008–18)
Starting in 2008, the villagers, who were inspired by the 6 April movement of the same 
year, started protesting collectively, both in Al-Tahseen and in front of the municipal-
ity building of Bany Ebeid (within a 30-minute drive from the village). Following several 
weeks of protest and local reporting on the movement, the Egyptian army interfered and 
built the village’s only school; a multi-storey primary school on land purchased through 
landowner and gain legal protection against arbitrary evictions (farmers were equally allocated four and 
a half acres of land, which the state retained ownership of). 
11   Ayeb and Bush, ‘Small Farmer Uprisings’.
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Al-Tahseen’s local fund, which was established by the villagers in the early 2000s. This 
collective fund is based on a head tax that villagers pay to fulfil their basic needs, such as 
providing alternative sewage systems through trenches (as part of a national scheme to 
increase safe drinking water in the country with the village having access to clean water 
in 2010). Meanwhile, the village’s electric generator only provides electricity to half of 
its inhabitants, depriving them of all using electricity at the same time. Through their 
collective fund, the villagers managed to create their own sewage treatment and rubbish 
collection systems, build their own community mosque, and provide alternative modes of 
transportation to the ‘outside world’ with the use of tuktuks. 
When protests broke out on 25 January 2011, only 2 of my 70 respondents from the village 
reported participating in the uprising. A year later, in January 2012, the villagers held a sit-in 
and declared a hunger strike12 at the municipality administration building of Bany Ebeid, 
demanding that the school be equipped with better educational infrastructure. However, 
these calls were ignored, and the villagers consequently declared civil disobedience on 9 
September (the beginning of the new academic year), reasserting the need for adequate 
school equipment and essential roadworks. In response, the governor of Daqahleya ver-
bally promised to allocate funds for the road. The students in turn declared a strike on 
15 September to pressure him to formalise the decision and, three days later, the villagers 
announced a hunger strike in the municipal building to protest against the governor’s inac-
tion. The villagers subsequently declared administrative secession from the governorate, 
stating that they would only engage with the presidency thereafter. Alongside this declara-
tion, a protest took place in front of the governorate’s building in Daqahleya as well. On 19 
September, Al-Tahseen protestors moved their demonstrations to the street overlooking 
the presidential palace in Cairo (occupied at the time by ex-President Mohamed Morsi) 
where they thought they would have a better chance of being heard. The villagers took the 
secession very seriously, banning state representatives from entering the village, including 
school teachers. They refused to negotiate with the governor of Daqahleya and instead 
directly asked the president to invest resources into Al-Tahseen’s school and main road. 
The villagers also refused to pay water and electricity bills, although it is unclear how they 
dealt with land rents, as it appears that some renters kept paying. In the following fiscal 
year (2013–14), the village was allocated a notable budget for road construction, which 
began but was never completed. No further funds were allocated afterwards, and by 2018 
the partially built road collapsed again.
After a long period of silence, following the regime change on 30 July 2013, and the 
ousting of ex-President Morsi, the people of Al-Tahseen renewed protest efforts in early 
2014. However, the changing political climate and rising repression prompted them to 
12   News reports on the village became scarce post-2014, especially with the increasing restrictions on 
free expression. However, the administrative secession, which was declared through a Facebook page 
that no longer exists, garnered the attention of various online newspapers. For instance, it received 
coverage in Nada El-Kouny’s article ‘Egyptian Delta Village Declares “Independence”After Decades of 
Neglect’, Ahram Online, 1 October 2012. Available at https://bit.ly/3oXulzG (accessed 19 January 2021).
10 Revolution in Parallel Times: An Egyptian Village’s Lived Revolution
critically change their tactics, while preserving the core objectives of their movement. 
From then on, they omitted any mention of civil disobedience or administrative seces-
sion. Instead, they renewed their demands for road funding to be disbursed through 
the state budget. Certainly, the military’s ascension to power was a significant moment 
that affected their movement prompting the villagers to change how they voiced their 
demands, as well as their views on the prospects of mobilisation and achieving transfor-
mative change. In effect, protest tactics were revised as state repression against activists 
escalated. During my visit to Al-Tahseen in 2015, the villagers shared that they were 
collecting bail money for men who were arrested during a large protest against water 
pollution in the village. Ironically, the people arrested were falsely charged with pollut-
ing the water, rather than for protesting against it. This experience of unlawful arrest 
marked a lesson for the villagers: even within the confines of their small village, protests 
were not tolerated. Despite this, they led more in 2016, both in Al-Tahseen and at the 
municipal building, reiterating their demands for new road constructions and express-
ing their objection to the dumping of industrial waste cargo in the village. In 2018, more 
protests took place and will likely continue to occur as long as Al-Tahseen remains iso-
lated and continuously deprived of basic services. 
Despite this, the villagers still cite their 21 days of civil disobedience in 2012 as their 
moment of dignity and history-making. Similar to the 25 January revolution, in which the 
18-day uprising was considered utopian, the people of Al-Tahseen talk of their own revo-
lution (the 21 days of civil disobedience) as a utopic experience that included a sense of 
unprecedented (albeit short-lived) unity, as well as an embodiment of the future in the 
present, whereby villagers worked together to clean the streets, better their production, 
lives and services. Ahmed, the village lawyer, recounts:
I told them that a necessary condition to attaining success was to not have lead-
ership. We didn’t have a leader, we moved ourselves. I proposed an idea, we dis-
cussed it, and we voted on it. If the majority agreed on the idea, we all agreed. It 
was a kind of direct democracy which we implemented in the village during the 
21-day action.
With regular meetings in the mosque (its microphone key in helping gather the village 
members), the mobilisation efforts at all stages were described as horizontal and leader-
less. In other words, the utopia and extraordinariness of revolution was experienced at the 
local level in Al-Tahseen’s 21 days of civil disobedience. This collective experience calls 
into question how Al-Tahseen’s movement relates to the 25 January revolution. 
Al-Tahseen’s Movement as a Local Revolution
When asked about the 2011 revolution, most villagers described the event as a great 
achievement they witnessed on television. Only two of over 70 respondents actually left 
Al-Tahseen to take part in the demonstrations. More interestingly, when asked about the 
relationship between their local mobilisation and the 25 January revolution, the villagers 
distanced their actions from the latter. Sobhy (interviewed in 2014) was not interested in 
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expressing his personal views on the 2011 revolution. Instead, he insisted that Al-Tahseen 
had been mobilising prior to this, noting that the latter did not trigger the village’s efforts 
towards collective action: ‘The entire thing [our revolution] was in our head before the 
25 January revolution’. Other villagers go further to claim that the January 2011 revolution 
was inspired by their own. Ali, for example, explained: 
I watched the [25 January] revolution on TV […] I supported it, because you can 
regard us as the first people to have revolted. We are like the first people to have 
carried out a revolution, and maybe the reason for the nation-wide revolution is 
Al-Tahseen’s. Why? Because we didn’t have sewage, or asphalt on the road, or 
schools. We were cut off from the world. It’s over, what do we have left [to worry 
about]? […] we either get our rights, or just die where we are. 
Ali’s statement highlights the complex relationship between Al-Tahseen and the events 
following 25 January. It brings up the two different uses of the term ‘revolution’ that I 
allude to above, whereby al-thawra denotes the national event and its metanarrative, 
while thawretna (our revolution) and thawret Al-Tahseen (Al-Tahseen’s revolution) evokes 
the particular, the contingent and the local. 
Not only does Al-Tahseen place itself discursively at a distance from the 25 January 
revolution, the village’s political contentions are temporally distinguishable from it, too. 
The villagers observed the protests in Tahrir Square closely, not as their own cause 
requiring direct participation in, but sometimes to express support for the revolution-
aries, and other times to judge them. When the protests erupted in Cairo, the villagers 
in Al-Tahseen waited until January of the following year to start voicing their demands 
and mobilising in the lead up to their declaration of administrative secession from the 
governorate in September 2012 (during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood). With the 
ousting of President Morsi in 2013, and the subsequent military takeover, the village 
consciously halted its mobilisation. This break was not necessarily driven by the intim-
idating nature of the military-backed government, which actively cracked down on 
protests since its ascension to power. Indeed, Al-Tahseen resumed its protest in early 
2014, voicing the same demands while minimising any mention of ‘civil disobedience’ 
or ‘secession’. The timeline of Al-Tahseen’s intermittent mobilisations illustrates the 
ways in which the village negotiates its tactics and position vis-à-vis national politics, 
namely how it engages with the latter and actively differentiates itself from it. The vil-
lage’s relationship to the 25 January revolution showcases this temporal engagement, 
whereby Al-Tahseen’s own timeline is inspired by, but not identical to, the chronology 
of the January uprising. The parallels or similarities between both were already clear in 
2008, when the 6 April Youth Movement organised a national general strike in support 
of the strike declared by the militant workers of El-Mahalla El-Kubra, an event that 
shook all major cities in Egypt.13 When talking about Al-Tahseen’s movement (hiraak 
Al-Tahseen), Ahmed, the village lawyer, always starts from the 6 April general strike of 
2008. While neither he, nor any of his fellow villagers joined, it was very consequential 
13   Rabab El-Mahdi, ‘Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Meanings’, Review of African Political Economy 
38/129 (2011), pp. 387–402.
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for them. According to Ahmed, 2008 revealed the nationwide injustice that existed and 
that people were doing something to address it. Ahmed recounted his first protest expe-
rience in the village, which happened a few months later in September 2008. The wait 
time between the general strike and the village protest was not accidental, it was rather 
well calculated. Indeed, when national politics is marked by significant urban protests 
and oppositional politics,14 the villagers suspend their own plans for protest until there 
is enough room for their voices to be heard at the national level. The same logic seems 
to apply when considering the village’s relationship to the 2011 uprisings. 
When asked about their own movement in Al-Tahseen, the village lawyer Ahmed distin-
guishes it from the 25 January revolution, stating: 
After the revolution, we thought we would have the patience to wait two to three 
years until the state becomes stable, to not overburden it and contribute to its 
destruction …so that when we choose to revolt, the situation would have already 
been stable; there would have been an elected parliament in place, a president, 
stable state institutions – institutions that are complete, including the state, con-
stitution, president, parliament… We could then start voicing our demands. But 
we had to wait again. Now [post 2013–14], the state has no parliament to help, the 
presidency has never-ending problems, and there is terrorism. 
The villagers largely justify their timeline for collective action based on these reasons 
and set it apart from what many of them described as the selfish, sector-based, protest 
demands of the 25 January revolutionaries. The villagers contrast the patience, selfless-
ness and patriotism of their approach to the disruptions and instability caused by the 
25 January revolution and its aftermath. While Al-Tahseen residents actively choose to 
dis-identify with the latter, they still observed the revolution closely, hoping it would 
succeed in bringing about transformative change that would improve their livelihoods. 
Sheikh Abdallah explained how:
during the days of the thawra [revolution], all people and every sector took part 
in the demonstrations; workers in factories – even the authority responsible for 
security took part [most likely referring to the police] […] maybe even the judges 
took part […] it’s only the farmer who did not. 
The Sheikh explained that farmers, who comprise 60 percent of society, are the ‘only 
group who have not participated during the days of the demonstrations (ayam el-mozah-
rat)’. This statement reflects his perception of farmers as selfless, and his articulation of 
their superior role during the revolution in their choice to refrain from burdening a nation 
in flux. Yet most notably here, the statement outlines the temporal differentiation of the 
village’s mobilisation from the January 2011 revolution. While the Sheikh does not deny 
the protests and demands of the village, he is keen to highlight that the farmers did not 
take part in the 18-day uprising of 25 January 2011. 
14   Ahmed and others sometimes refer to national politics as politics of ‘the country’ (il-balad), or ‘in 
Egypt’ (fi Masr) or ‘in Cairo’ (fil Qahira). Despite the local nature of the El-Mahalla Strike and its loca-
tion (outside Cairo), it spread and became a general, nationwide strike. For the villagers, the ensuing 
events in Cairo and Alexandria turned this local event into a political moment of national scale. 
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Even though the villagers were not part of the latter, they expected it to positively affect 
their livelihoods. Adam explains, ‘We participated with our hearts; we were watching and 
supporting the revolution back then. But now, there is no revolution. As long as there is 
no change, there is no revolution.’ Similarly, 55-year-old Hossam exclaimed: ‘Revolution?! 
What revolution?’ He recounted the pervasive corruption of the police force, asserting 
that there could be no revolution as long as people’s lived realities remain the same. One 
of the main ways that desperation is embodied at the local level is through the criminal-
isation of protest: the villagers were aware of the restrictions imposed by the post-2013 
Protest Legislation (law 107), which became a barrier to their mobilisation – one that they 
needed to strategise against in order to overcome. Perhaps the most critical way the villag-
ers revisited their strategy was by abandoning the narrative of ‘administrative secession’ 
when General El-Sisi was appointed president in July 2014. Ahmed the lawyer explained 
the impact of the new regime on the villagers’ tactics: 
They criminalise every objection that has a loud voice, or uses demonstrations, 
or direct action. Imagine if we were to come now and talk about administrative 
secession, or if anyone declared administrative secession? I swear to God, the 
state security [al-amn al-watany] would detain 90 percent of the secessionists by 
the next morning. 
In other words, regime change and broader shifts in national politics did not put an 
end to Al-Tahseen’s movement. However, it prompted the need to re-evaluate and 
change protest tactics.
Table 1: A Parallel Timeline of Contentions
Year Politics at the National Scale Al-Tahseen
2006 Al-Mahalla Al-Kubra protests Articles in national papers on Al-Tahseen’s 
deprivation
2008 April: Al-Mahalla General Strike September: protest in Mansoura city 
(demands: roadworks and school equipment)
2011 January: Popular uprising that overthrew 
President Mubarak, known as the 25 January 
revolution.
2012 January: protests and hunger strike 
(demands: roadworks and school equipment)
9 September: civil disobedience declared
15 September: student strike
18 September: threat of secession and 
hunger strike
21 September: Al-Tahseen declares 
administrative secession declared and 
hunger strike ended
27 September: lawsuit against governor
14 Revolution in Parallel Times: An Egyptian Village’s Lived Revolution
Year Politics at the National Scale Al-Tahseen
2013 July: regime change/new transitional 
government and new protest law.
2014 June: El-Sisi elected as president April: movement returns without secession 
language (demands: budget for road 
completion)
2015 November: water pollution protest and 
arrests
2016 April: Land Day protests November: protests demanding road 
reconstruction and against industrial waste 
cargo polluting the village
2018 June: protests break out as the village’s 
allocated budget does not cover the 
roadworks
Redefining ‘The Political’
Al-Tahseen villagers, who declared secession from the Daqahleya governorate, claimed 
they were not ‘political’. After explaining how El-Sisi restricted their efforts to mobil-
ise post-2014, Adam (who permanently resides in Al-Tahseen but works occasionally in 
Cairo) stated: ‘As far as we are concerned, we neither know of politics nor understand [it].’ 
One way the villagers view their engagement as apolitical is in that they do not claim who 
should be in office. For example, the lawyer Ahmed explained: ‘We do not care who is in 
power, we only care about the service provided’. Ahmed, who played a significant role in 
organising mosque meetings, and mobilising youth for protests, hunger strike and civil 
disobedience, maintains a negative view of politicians (al-siyaseyeen). To him, the latter 
are not necessarily only those in power, but those who seek it, as well as those who tried 
to exploit Al-Tahseen’s mobilisation and use it for political gains. This negative view is not 
only reserved for politicians, al-siyaseyeen, but also for certain types of political activity, 
including participation in demonstrations (al-muthaharaat). When asked in 2015 about 
the villagers’ plans to take their mobilisation further, Samer exclaimed: ‘No, no demon-
strations! We have nothing to do with demonstrations! We here are good, poor farmers. 
[…] we have nothing to do with calls for demonstrations.’ When I asked about the mobil-
isation that the village undertook, Samer quickly clarified: ‘Yes we did that, a protest for 
the [construction of the] road. That was a protest (ihtijaj), not demonstrations (mush 
muthaharat yaani).’ Samer was not the only person to make this distinction. Perhaps 
borne out of the necessity of the post–2013 moment, the village actively distinguished 
its actions from the ones undertaken by national activists (while holding Al-Tahseen’s 
activism in higher regard). Distinguishing between protests and demonstrations is pecu-
liar, in that many respondents outlined the negative connotations of ‘demonstrations’, 
describing them as ‘disruptive’, ‘political’ and ‘sector-based’ – all of which are adjectives 
popularised by the post–2013 media machine. This contrasts to Al-Tahseen’s protests and 
acts of civil disobedience, which were viewed as ‘defensive’, ‘social’ and ‘for the common 
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good’. Unpacking the differences between the terms ‘demonstration’ and ‘protest’ is 
important here, although it requires deeper investigation into the historical and affective 
modes through which the villagers relate to them. Suffice to add that the performance of 
demonstrations (the Arabic verb tathahur) embodies a physical act of visibility, whereby 
the body performs the act of objection in an exposing or public way. Protest (ihtijaj), on 
the contrary, can be a silent, verbal or ideological mode of expression that does not bring 
the physicality of objection into the picture, and therefore might be viewed as the safer or 
less confrontational option.
Politics is not only defined thematically (for instance, by the decision to partake in party 
politics or not), or discursively (in comparing ‘demonstrations’ and ‘protests’ as men-
tioned above). Politics is also defined in spatial terms and is often assumed to take place 
at the national level rather than the local. From the villagers’ perspective, protests at 
the ‘local level’ are tied to the struggle for better livelihoods of everyday citizens, while 
the ‘national level’ is often viewed as the selfish race to power. For the villagers, the fact 
that the 2008 general strike called for better working conditions for tens of thousands of 
El-Mahalla workers who protested against increased food prices nationwide seems to be 
eclipsed by the national scale and weight of the event. Similarly, the fact that the 25 January 
revolution rose in response to both police brutality and the impoverishment of ordinary 
citizens is obscured to the villagers by its political consequences, namely the resulting 
referenda, parliamentary and presidential elections, and the competition between polit-
ical parties for their foothold in government. The villagers’ belief in the apolitical nature 
of their protest actions can be better understood by taking into account their negative 
view of politicians. The irony lies in the fact that villagers would describe their seces-
sionist movement as a development that lies outside the realm of politics – an assertion 
perhaps best reflected in the expression: ‘the pragmatic politics of the poor’.15 While this 
binary perspective posits the national and local as two separate spheres (with the latter 
described as apolitical), this dichotomy makes little sense upon closer inspection. 
In fact, many of these complexities between the local and the national can be illustrated 
through the villagers’ perception of security measures and narratives that were prominent 
in Egypt’s post-2014 era. Indeed, many villagers noticeably give El-Sisi credit for the security 
(al-amn) they enjoy. This statement might have passed unnoticed, except that in a village 
that remains marginalised and that generally lacks law enforcement mechanisms and police 
presence, the populace’s views on security foregrounds the impact of the national narrative 
on their perceptions of security in the village. Adam, who denies any knowledge or under-
standing of politics, explains that El-Sisi is restrictive, but nonetheless provides security: ‘We 
are living in security, so it is not bad. The situation is not bad’. What ‘living in security’ means 
for the villagers is, however, very different from in the city, where it may mean less crime, 
more police presence and a semblance of law and order. In Al-Tahseen, I could extract 
two ways in which the villagers related to ‘security’ – none of which is a product of their 
local realities, but rather of their engagement with national politics, and particularly their 
15   Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2010), p. 16.
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consumption of state media narratives. First, several villagers viewed their relative security 
in juxtaposition to the struggles of the Syrian diaspora following the Syrian revolution and 
subsequent conflict. When asked about what he meant by ‘security’, Sameh exclaimed: 
Did you see the Syrians and what they are doing? Did you see the people who were 
forcibly displaced from their homes? We are staying here, even if we [only] eat 
bread and heat it on fire! 
This statement aligns with grand narratives circulating on Egyptian television that highlight 
how the army has arguably saved the country from falling into civil war. This perception of 
security is thus constructed in relation to the lack thereof in a country so similar to Egypt, 
not the least in its experience of an extraordinary revolution. Second, ‘security’ is viewed 
as the guarantee of law and order at the national level. When asked whether the police 
are now more readily available to protect the village, Adam denied this, clarifying that 
Egypt as a whole is safer; that ‘we all live in security’. This view is mostly informed by the 
dominant state media narrative that characterises the country as safe from both crime and 
civil war, but has no material implications for a marginalised village such as Al-Tahseen. 
In fact, after arguing in favour of the security enjoyed under El-Sisi’s presidency, Sameh 
continued to elaborate on the number of deaths due to accidents on the village’s ‘death 
road’. This ironic exchange is therefore better understood by taking into consideration the 
village’s complex relationship to the government and nation. 
Nation, Government, Village
The villagers are positioned in unique ways in relation to different levels of government 
and changes that occur within them. The ‘nation’, a term which encompasses national 
interest and the common good, is usually juxtaposed to the ‘government’, which suggests 
inaction, corruption and failure. Al-Tahseen’s very unique relationship to the nation, as 
the product of a social engineering project, lies at the core of the villagers’ contentious 
notions of local and national politics. Here, the origin story of Al-Tahseen is crucial. While 
some villagers shared their feeling of indebtedness to the nation, for creating Al-Tahseen 
out of desert lands, another group mentioned that their fathers were the ones who trans-
formed the village from desert into a ‘paradise’. Sheikh Abdallah, from the local mosque, 
expressed his gratitude to the state, which he described as a ‘father’ that gifts his ‘children’ 
with land, resources and life. Some, however, resist the notion that the state created the 
village or had any beneficial impact on it. For instance, Ahmed the lawyer shared his views 
on the villagers’ fundamental role in making Al-Tahseen liveable: 
The state gave the land to the farmers. It was a barren and infertile land. The peo-
ple suffered tremendously – our grandparents and parents died for the land while 
they were reconstructing it. The land started to generate produce and the farmers 
started to reap its fruits. Yet, after thirty years, in the nineties, the state sold it to 
us at market price, on a sale day, not at its price when we acquired it. 
This statement reflects the villagers’ relationship to nationalism. While the Sheikh and 
other villagers give significant credit and gratitude to the state, seeing it as a generous 
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source of gifts whereby citizens are passive recipients, others like Ahmed and many of 
Al-Tahseen’s youth claim the state, land and the very life they live as a product of their 
own (and of their parents and grandparents’) legacies, thus highlighting their agency. This, 
in turn, has significant consequences on their understanding of their rights and their view 
of politics. Al-Tahseen’s youth are more articulate about change as a struggle in which 
they have to engage, while the elders largely wait for the state to generously grant them 
better livelihoods. This is not to say that the people of Al-Tahseen necessarily fall within 
one of these two archetypes. The situation is certainly more fluid than such a dichot-
omy can suggest. For example, while speaking of the state as a paternal figure, Sheikh 
El-Balad, an elder village leader equivalent to the Omda in other villages,16 mentions how 
the state inflicted poverty on its own people by denying them their basic rights. These 
varying views therefore reflect the villagers’ complex relationship with Al-Tahseen, their 
government and the nation. Regardless, due to the village’s history and its particular role 
in the national project, administrative secession was emphasised as a separation from the 
governorate, not the nation as a whole.
While the village’s history led to a mixed view of the country at large, the people of 
Al-Tahseen generally believed that the government failed to guarantee reciprocity in its 
relationship with them. Sheikh El-Balad explained:
Land for a price, walls for a price, electricity for a price, water for a price […] but 
when I demand my legitimate right, I cannot find it, why am I paying then? And 
what am I paying for? Why have I paid for this piece of land then?
His words echoing shared sentiments within the community. In some cases, my inter-
locutors did not differentiate between local and central government and referred to 
hukoomah (‘government’) as one entity. This seemed to be the case when both local and 
central government were seen as corrupt or as helpless and lacking budgets. Neverthe-
less, distinctions between different levels of government were notable during Morsi’s 
presidency in 2013 when the villagers focused blame on the central government for its 
imposed budget on local administrations and the lack of municipal elections during 
that period. For example, as Sheikh El-Balad explains: ‘We did not elect the governor 
so we can’t really say that he is accountable, but we did elect the president, and he is 
the person accountable to us.’ However, in more recent interviews, starting in 2014, 
the central government was often described as well-meaning, while local councils were 
deemed corrupt – as reflected in Hossam’s statement: ‘The entire problem of the state 
lies within the local council.’ This shift to placing the blame on the local and finding 
excuses for the national government might very well be one of the strategic tactics 
adopted by the villagers to practise dissent in times of shrinking civil spaces. Thus 
blaming the local government instead of the national leadership perhaps represents a 
pragmatic shift in tactics to navigate the changing political context. 
16   Omda is the traditional title of the village chief, who is also a government official. Because Al-Tahseen 
is not officially considered a village, it does not have its own Omda, but Sheikh El-Balad acts as its de 
facto chief. 
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Changing Times, Tactics and Politics
Al-Tahseen’s movement offers a unique lens on the practice of politics in changing politi-
cal climates. The village has been fighting to construct its main road since 2008 – a struggle 
which continues to this day. While rising authoritarianism and repression did not destroy 
their movement, it certainly slowed it down, prompting villagers to change their protest 
tactics. The need to do so was evident from early on, as the country’s political polarisation 
exacerbated in the aftermath of the 2013 coup and the Rabʿaa massacre in August of the 
same year. During this period, any semblance of political opposition was portrayed by the 
media as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood – a crime in its own right. The latter was, in 
turn, outlawed as an alleged terrorist organisation.17 The situation gave rise to two oppos-
ing camps: those who supported the transitional government led by El-Sisi; and those 
who sympathised with or continued to fight for the Muslim Brotherhood’s fallen admin-
istration. This challenging political climate paralysed Al-Tahseen for a while and called 
upon the people to re-strategise. Ahmed, the village lawyer, shared his reflections on such 
tensions: ‘I am defending people. They are neither Muslim brothers nor [any of this] crap 
[…], they are our friends, our loved ones, our brethren’. Because of this, Ahmed outlined 
the village’s need to intricately navigate their collective position vis-à-vis this polarisation 
or ‘clash’ (sedam) on the national level, and to find space to voice their demands while 
avoiding entanglements in ‘unnecessary politics’. Ahmed pointed out that civic space had 
shrunk by 2014, when the 2013 Protest Law was passed, criminalising public gatherings: 
I say, sir, I don’t like the Muslim Brotherhood, but El-Sisi is not the saviour or a 
God […] We haven’t elected a leader, we elected a president, a head of state. If he 
does well, I will clap for him, and if he does badly, I will criticise him… but in turn, 
[the regime] criminalises dissent.
Sheikh Abdallah of Al-Tahseen’s mosque (the village’s primary space for civic mobilisa-
tion) spoke of the need to shift protest tactics to adapt to changes in the political landscape: 
What we used to do back then cannot be done again today: the Brotherhood 
could not have been dealt with in a different way... that was what worked with 
them. But [the same tactics] won’t work with the government we have today. 
While the Sheikh spoke optimistically about El-Sisi’s government in 2014, others viewed 
the security state and El-Sisi as a repressive counter-revolutionary force. For example, 
Emad, a middle-aged farmer, compared El-Sisi to Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad, accusing both 
of ‘depleting the political soil and life of the country’. Emad expressed his political despair, 
wondering: ‘Even if another revolution takes place, who will come to power?’
17   A court order in 2014 banned the Muslim Brotherhood organisation, and dissolved its political wing, 
the Freedom and Justice Party, while confiscating the assets of its members. For more information see: 
‘Egypt Court Bans Muslim Brotherhood Political Wing’, BBC, 9 August 2014. Available at https://bbc.
in/35SW791 (accessed 19 January 2021).
Heba M. Khalil 19 
Moreover, this polarised environment prompted people to negotiate belonging and dif-
ferent conceptualisations of public interest – linked to views on nationalism. More 
specifically, in light of dominant narratives on the ‘interests of the nation’, Al-Tahseen’s 
demands were instantly re-categorised by many of its people as a matter of ‘private inter-
est’. While striving for the common good remained Al-Tahseen’s core objective, views 
changed on what this meant. In 2012, the ‘community’ referred to the village for many of 
my interlocutors, while in the years that followed and particularly post-2014, it referred to 
all Egyptians. The Suez Canal megaproject, launched in 2014, is an interesting example of 
the ways in which the villagers largely prioritised ‘national interest’, which justified post-
poning collective action in Al-Tahseen until the canal project was completed. However, 
a group of younger villagers maintained the view that their local demands ought to take 
precedence, while acknowledging that public opinion was not on their side, especially at 
a time when ‘the president gave up 50 percent of his salary for the Canal construction’, as 
one of them mentioned. They went on to say: ‘If it weren’t for the Suez Canal, we would 
not have been silenced.’ Al-Tahseen post-2014 thus highlights the villagers’ turn towards 
less contentious political tactics, but also expresses the contending views of its now far-
from-united inhabitants. 
With the outbreak of the Land Protests in April 2016, in response to the cession of the 
Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia, and the resulting mass arrests,18 protests became 
more costly than ever. In November 2018, I talked to a community activist named Ahmed, 
while the villagers were discussing a potential protest plan (again, for fixing their ‘death 
road’, which was particularly unsafe then due to winter floods): 
It is not a question of protest, it is a choice of where, when and in what ways. We 
were arrested right here in our village on charges of water pollution as we were 
protesting against the very water that poisons us and our children. You have to 
tread carefully with this government, really.
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the relationship between Al-Tahseen’s local uprising and move-
ment and the 25 January revolution in 2011 investigating the way in which politics is 
perceived at the local level, and how this perception is constructed in relation to the 
January uprising and the nation more broadly. In doing so, it has explored the connections 
between the local and the national, the particular and the general, the everyday person 
and the revolutionary. For future research, it is necessary to investigate the ways in which 
everyday people become revolutionary; how incremental actions of resistance turn into 
larger, growing movements, and how the latter are negotiated, put on hold, and renewed 
in times of changing political circumstances at the national level. I have tried in this paper 
18   For more information on the arrests, see: Declan Walsh, ‘Egypt sentences 152 to Prison for Protest over 
Transfer of Islands’, The New York Times, 14 May 2016. Available at https://nyti.ms/2NdOtPP (accessed 
19 January 2021).
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to emphasise the villagers’ distinct position; neither as part of the January revolution, 
nor completely excluded from it. Instead, I propose viewing the mobilising village as one 
in constant engagement and negotiation with politics at the national scale more gener-
ally. Instead of bringing the village to the centre of the January 2011 revolution, I insist 
that Al-Tahseen forms a contingent reality for a national event that is hard to pinpoint as 
singular, exclusive or specific. By investigating particular revolutions as lived by their mul-
tiple actors, we may arrive at a view of the January 2011 revolution as a pluralistic, fluid and 
boundaryless phenomenon. While the village felt despair at the failures of 2011, and many 
other localised revolutions nationwide felt so as well, cases like Al-Tahseen are a call for 
hope, showing that the struggle for better livelihoods never ends. While ‘the national’ does 
affect the prospects of mobilisation at the local level, it does not completely undermine 
them either. It merely redraws the parameters – well illustrated by the case of Al-Tahseen. 
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